The Americans with Disabilities Act purports to protect people with "physical or mental" impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) . 6 Rogers v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Insurers have historically and consistently made distinctions between mental and physical illness in offering health and disability coverage"). See also GROUP INSURANCE 442 (William F. Bluhm et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996) ("Most LTD [long-term disability] plans impose a lifetime limit of 24 months on benefits for disabilities due to mental and nervous conditions when not confined to an institution."); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO DISABILITY-BASED PROVI-SIONS OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (1993), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ docs/guidance.pdf ("Typically, a lower level of benefits is provided for the treatment of mental/nervous conditions than is provided for the treatment of physical conditions."). A recent article in the American Medical News reports, "Many plans, for example, require more prior authorizations or higher patient cost-sharing for mental health benefits than they do for medical or surgical benefits." Doug Trapp, Mental Health Coverage to See Boost as Long-Sought Parity Law is Enacted, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/ 10/27/gvl11027.htm (reporting a new law that should improve mental health benefits by requiring parity with physical health benefits). 7 For a comparable discussion in the United Kingdom, see ROY SAINSBURY ET AL., DEP'T FOR WORK & PENSIONS, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 513, MENTAL HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT (2008) . See also Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Criado's physician testified that if given a significant leave she could adjust to her situation and after he experimented with medication she might return to her previous level of functionality. This evidence indicates that with a reasonable accommodation Criado could perform the essential functions of her job."). 8 However, important changes to these laws could significantly improve the lives of the mentally ill. On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act ("ADAAA") into law. 12 Less than one month later, mental health parity in employer-provided health insurance became a federal mandate when the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 ("Wellstone Act") 13 was quietly enacted as part of the congressional economic bailout.
14 The aforementioned new laws might actually bring society one step closer towards ending discrimination against the mentally ill. 15 At a time when the Obama presidency is framing the social issues for the next half-decade, and when a woman accepted the Republican vice-presidential nomination moments before cradling her special needs infant in her arms, mental health is ever-present in the news. That is atypical. In over a dozen years, no significant legislation nor federal agency has focused on the problems Firms that employ high proportions of female workers, part-time workers, and seasonal workers "are known to offer health insurance less often, and when they offer it, they are less likely to offer generous benefits." GAIL A. JENSEN, EMPLOYER CHOICE OF WAGE SUPPLEMENTS 35-37 (1986 16 Until now, mental illness demonstrated an almost irreconcilable conflict between economy and shame, made even worse by stereotypical thinking that stigmatizes the mentally ill or impaired. "Treating people differently on the basis of mental illness does not provoke the same moral outrage as that inspired by differential treatment on the basis of race, sex, or even physical disability." 17 Society's reluctance to treat individuals with mental illness with equality leads to the loss of talents and makes it far more challenging for these individuals to contribute their accomplished skills to society. This loss is simply inefficient and unjust. Moreover, the spillover into the lives of families, co-workers, and communities is harsh. 18 Although not representing a solution to the problem that half of our population is uninsured, the ADAAA and Wellstone Act might actually bring us one step closer to mental health parity in the United States.
This Article examines these two new laws. Part II provides a brief background on the ADA and describes the amendments to it in the ADAAA. Part III describes the Wellstone Act. Part IV discusses positive effects the new laws could have on easing stereotypes, lowering employer costs, and living in an ethically better society. ity. 19 The ADA is a civil rights law that treats disability in a way similar to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 with regard to race, religion, gender, and ethnicity. Operationally, however, the ADA works differently than the Civil Rights Act. People seeking ADA protection must first prove they are disabled in order to be afforded protection under the Act. 20 The ADA provides that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability." 21 An employer discriminates on the basis of disability if it does not make reasonable accommodations for an employee's disability, unless the employer can show the accommodations represent an undue hardship. 22 The ADA defines disability as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AMENDMENTS ACT

23
When the ADA first passed in 1990, advocates believed the language of the Act and the legislative history would provide courts with enough guidance to carry out the Act's purpose. 24 However, over time, courts interpreted the Act so narrowly that its purpose seemed to get lost along the way. 25 Many courts interpreted the statutory definition of disability very differently than the original advocates and drafters of the ADA envisioned. Courts considered the language of the statute clear and rarely looked to legislative intent for guidance, which gave the courts room to interpret their own definitions of terms in the Act. 26 29 The Sutton plaintiffs were twin sister pilots who wore corrective lenses to remedy nearsightedness. 30 The lenses corrected their vision nearly one hundred percent. 31 Even so, as eyeglasses-wearers, the court held that the plaintiffs' employer was permitted to disqualify them from working as pilots because of their visual impairments.
32
The Supreme Court's discussions of mitigating measures to correct a disability in Sutton must be read in factual context. The Court ruled that the nearsighted pilots were not "disabled" under the ADA because their vision was presently corrected with eyeglasses, and thus they were not entitled to statutory protection. 33 Sutton was a bad case for the Court to determine whether disabilities correctable with mitigating measures receive protection under the ADA. Near-sightedness is easily, and often, completely and permanently remediable. Bipolar disorder, on the other hand, may not be. Moreover, eyeglasses do not have the damaging negative effects many psychotropic drugs cause. One could speculate that a rational person may be unlikely to eschew spectacles to correct poor vision and prescription drugs that lower blood pressure because such measures typically cause few side effects (and are among the best sellers in the pharmaceuticals industry). With such disorders, the disease itself does not interfere with use of the corrective measure. That is often not true in cases of mental illness. A truly afflicted individual may experience persistent psychiatric symptoms that "prevent the person from having insight into the need for medication."
34 Nearly all psychotropic drugs have physical or mental sequel- 37 the Supreme Court substantially limited what it considered to be an impairment that affects a major life activity. The Court determined an impairment is "substantially limiting" if it "prevents" or "severely restricts" an individual from performing a "major life activity."
38 It defined a major life activity as one that is of "central importance to daily life." 39 Further, the Court held that this requirement must be "interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." 40 This language clearly evidenced the Court's intent to limit the number of people who could qualify as disabled under the ADA.
After Sutton and Toyota, the protections offered by the ADA became much more tenuous and very few people qualified for protection under the Act. As a result, Congress recently stepped in and enacted the ADAAA to attain the original intent of the ADA.
41
B. The ADA's Application to Mental Illness
Pre-dating the 2008 Amendments, courts rarely found mental conditions sufficiently severe so as to qualify as a disability; symptoms had to be persistent. 42 Plaintiffs could not qualify for accommodations if they "caused" their disabilities, and were usually held responsible for being drug and treatment compliant. 43 As set forth in Sutton, if ameliorative measures managed an indi- 44 Courts often read the Act's provision requiring a disability to "substantially limit" a major life activity as essentially disqualifying any person who is able to maintain a job from no protection under the ADA, no matter how difficult it may be for the individual to hold the job. 45 If a plaintiff complained that his employer "regarded" him as disabled, and therefore treated him adversely, he had no claim for accommodation unless he could also prove that he was, indeed, substantially limited. 46 These perverted results may have resulted from poor drafting, judicial obduracy, or prejudice. As the First Circuit opined in an analogous Federal Rehabilitation Act 47 case:
A plaintiff . . . confronts a potential 'Catch 22' . . . She must show both that her impairment substantially limits a major life activity and that she is 'otherwise qualified' for her job, . . . In shorthand, the law requires the individual to be both substantially limited and reasonably functional.
48
A plethora of lawsuits and an avalanche of scholarly articles have failed to create an unwavering taxonomy of activities that constitute "major life activities." Some litigation has focused on whether working is a major life activity. 49 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") without limitation.' Thus, his depression is corrected and cannot substantially limit a major life activity-a requirement for finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA."); Keoughan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 96-4072, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12232, at *3-6 (10th Cir. May 27, 1997) (The plaintiff, Ms. Keoughan, diagnosed with bipolar disorder, had stopped taking her medication (lithium) for the disorder, and "the district court determined that it was undisputed that Ms. Keoughan's disorder could be controlled and stabilized with lithium, and therefore she could perform all the essential functions of her job. Because the facts also show that Ms. Keoughan failed to take her lithium, the court granted Delta's motion for summary judgment."); Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 665-67 (7th Cir. 1995) (A probationary police officer experienced a diabetic reaction while on duty in his squad car which resulted in disorientation and memory loss, allegedly due to his failure to monitor his insulin. " [W] hen an employee knows that he is afflicted with a disability, needs no accommodation from his employer, and fails to meet 'the employer's legitimate job expectations,' . . . due to his failure to control a controllable disability, he cannot state a cause of action under the ADA." (citing DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F. Kan. Nov. 3, 1998) ("In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff's condition does not substantially limit him in his major life activities when he takes his medication as prescribed. In fact, his one panic attack occurred after he had quit taking his medication without so informing his doctor. The plaintiff cannot gain ADA protection by unilaterally deciding, without justification, not to use prescribed medication which corrects or alleviates his condition."). 44 The Ninth Circuit adopted such a broad view of the term "major life activity" in denying an employer's motion for summary judgment in McAlindin v. County of San Diego. 53 In that case, the plaintiff, a systems analyst, argued that his employer violated the ADA when it failed to transfer him to a less stressful job. 54 The court held:
These evaluations suggest that McAlindin suffers from a total inability to communicate at times, in addition to a more subtle impairment in engaging in meaningful discussion. His alleged "fear reaction" and "communicative paralysis" are sufficiently severe to raise a genuine issue of material fact about his ability to interact with others.
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The dissenting judge, however, articulated a common concern about the mentally ill:
[N]ot only do we serendipitously create a mischievous Pandora's box, but we then open it with a flourish and invite into federal court all but the 'cantankerous' to sue those employers with whom they cannot get along. Employers beware, now you may have an obligation at the risk of being sued to accommodate someone who does not possess the ability to "get along with others." Not only is this "disability" vague, but it's bizarre, ominous, and wholly outside of the group of serious disabilities Congress intended to cover with this statute. Does this opinion suggest that a person's foul temperament may no longer be a reason to deny that person a job? , http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.html. Agency guidelines and interpretations do not have the force and effect of law; however, they do offer the court guidance. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (The court frequently looks to EEOC guidelines for guidance in discrimination cases, which, " 'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance' " (citation omitted)); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002) 60 The court explained that an ADA violation did not occur where the police department forced an officer to participate in a mandatory supervision program, typically reserved for officers facing disciplinary action, after the officer revealed he was taking an antidepressant. 61 The officer argued that "his depression substantially limit[ed] his ability to perform the major life activity of working," and in the alternative, alleged an ADA violation because the Department "regarded" him as disabled by requiring him to participate in an employee assistance program usually reserved for officers with disciplinary problems.
62 Treating a worker as if he were disabled provides an alternate basis for protection under the ADA. 63 The Seventh Circuit draws a distinction between limitations and disabilities, and has held: "Employers do not run afoul . 60 Id. at 510. 61 Id. at 511. 62 Id. at 511, 513-14. The court concluded that the district court did not error in holding that Krocka was not substantially limited in a major life activity of working. Id. at 513. The court also concluded that Krocka did not provide sufficient evidence to establish his employer "regarded" him as disabled. Id. at 514. Therefore the court held the ADA did not protect Krocka. Id. at 514-15. 63 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-76, 489 (1999). In Sutton, two sibling pilots lost their bid for ADA protection due to severe myopia which disqualified them from flying airplanes. Id. at 475-76. The Supreme Court noted that in order to make out a claim under the 'regarded as' prong, "it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual." Id. at 489. These misperceptions may take the form of believing "either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment, when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting." Id. Reading Sutton's statement of the 'two apparent ways' as exhaustive, the Krocka court concluded that the police officer was neither perceived of as being disabled, nor was he disabled. Krocka, 203 F.3d at 513-14. The City did not consider Krocka disabled; in fact they expected him to work. Id. at 514. Officers who have run afoul of department practices, like those who suffer from depression, might need a bit more help and supervision. Id. at 514-15. Krocka deserves close examination because it gives a legal imprimatur to irrational and discriminatory treatment by an employer. 65 In the early 1980s, Vincent Krocka joined the Chicago Police Department as a police officer. 66 He received a decade of good performance evaluations. 67 In 1990, Krocka began receiving medical treatment for severe depression, including taking Prozac to alleviate his condition. 68 As a result of the medication, his psychological condition improved.
69 He continued to receive good performance evaluations.
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Ignoring Krocka's two years of successful performance while taking Prozac, in 1992, the Department learned that Krocka was taking the medication and placed him on medical leave pending the outcome of physical and psychological evaluations to determine his fitness for continued duty as a police officer. 71 After the evaluating physicians concluded that Krocka was fit for duty, he was allowed to return to work, subject to the condition that he participate in the Department's Personnel Concerns Program ("PCP"). 72 Under that program, the Department closely monitors participants to ensure no problems occur.
73
Department employees check in with such monitored officers throughout each shift and often accompany them on radio calls. 74 The Department puts all officers taking prescription psychotropic medication in the PCP because they are deemed to have "significant deviations from an officer's normal behavior."
75 Labeling a well-performing police officer on a psychotropic medication 'deviant' demonstrates stereotypical thinking. However, the ADA only protects the narrow class of employees who are, or are perceived to be, disabled. Simply thinking of those employees as deviant, or dangerous, will not bring them within the aegis of the ADA.
Judges, as well as employers, may hold beliefs that contradict the spirit of the ADA. A Texas federal district court judge rejected the notion that getting along with others qualifies as a "major life activity" in granting an employer's motion for summary judgment in Logan v. Nicholson productive employment, the employer began to require the plaintiff to attend staff meetings, which she characterized as too stressful. 77 The plaintiff was excused from the meetings for a short while and was allowed to simply read the notes from the meetings. 78 The employer eventually refused to continue this accommodation because "her attendance at the team meetings was an important part of her job duties." 79 The court agreed. In so finding, the court failed to address the implicit issue: the woman had a serious illness, for which she faithfully sought treatment, which prevented her from working. That, and only that, disabled her. Despite that fact, the court reasoned:
Plaintiff's mental impairment caused her to experience stress in staff meetings which were characterized by disagreements and raised voices. Plaintiff does not argue, and cannot argue given the facts in the record, that she is substantially limited in her ability to interact or communicate with others on a very basic level.
The court cannot subscribe to the view that Plaintiff's professed mood swings and stress-related symptoms experienced in contentious staff meetings are significant limitations to any major life activity . . . . 80 Accordingly, the court held that an accommodation was not legally required despite the plaintiff's inability to keep working for her current employer.
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In Bell v. Gonzalez, 82 a district court granted an employer's motion to dismiss an ADA claim by a federal worker with Tourette's Syndrome, finding that his illness did not significantly impair him. 83 Tourette's Syndrome is a neurological disorder that manifests itself at an early pre-teen age and it is characterized by verbal and motor tics. 84 Co-workers or employers are likely disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity . . . conducted by any Executive agency . . . ." Id. In order to state a claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove that he or she: (1) was an "individual with handicaps"; (2) was "otherwise qualified"; (3) worked for a "program or activity" receiving federal financial assistance; and (4) was "adversely treated solely because of his handicap. Many employers could accommodate an individual with Tourette's Syndrome by reassignment, providing "tic" breaks, and educating the workforce about the illness. 88 The Bell court seemed to appreciate the unfairness and potential discrimination, but it nonetheless ruled against the plaintiff.
89
Measuring whether a plaintiff is 'substantially limited' in interacting with others through the reactions of society would result in defining a disability based on the subjective and varied range of reactions of the persons with whom a plaintiff happens to come into contact, and would focus the inquiry away from a plaintiff's own abilities.
90
These lower court decisions followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court, further narrowing the ADA's protections in a manner contrary to its legislative purpose. 91 
C. Overview of the ADAAA
The ADAAA attempts to expand protections for the disabled by broadening the scope of persons considered to be disabled and clarifying the original intent of the ADA. 92 Eighteen years after the passage of the ADA, "many individuals with physical and mental impairments whom Congress intended to protect are not covered under the law, due to a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the definition of disability." 93 The House Report accompanying the ADAAA demonstrates: "The purpose of the bill is to restore protection for the broad range of individuals with disabilities as originally envisioned by Congress by responding to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the definition of disability." 94 The language of the ADA itself instructed courts and the EEOC to read the Act broadly.
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Congress specifically addressed and amended several parts of the ADA, four of which are crucial for employees with psychiatric illnesses. 96 The ADAAA redefines a "disability" as an impairment that is episodic or in remission, if the impairment substantially limits a major life activity when active. Under the ADAAA, Congress liberalized the meaning of "substantially limits" 98 and broadened the list of "major life activities." 99 It instructs that disabilities can include impairments that are episodic or controlled by drugs, therapy or learned behavioral, or adaptive neurological modifications. 100 The Act also explicitly reverses Sutton by directing courts not to consider mitigating measures when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. 101 However, Congress made an exception in allowing for the consideration of the mitigating measures of corrective lenses and eyeglasses.
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The ADAAA also allows a plaintiff to be "regarded as" disabled if she is treated adversely in the workplace because of her employer's belief that she has a mental disability, even if she does not. 103 Further, in the Act's "Findings and Purposes," Congress states that judicial and agency interpretations have eliminated "protection for many individuals Congress intended to protect," that courts read "the term 'substantially limits' to require a greater degree of limitation" than the original ADA intended, and thus the Act redefines the term to mean "materially restricts." 104 The House Report accompanying the Act stated that:
The Committee intends to lessen the standard of establishing whether an individual has a disability for purposes of coverage under the ADA, and to refocus the question on whether discrimination on the basis of disability occurred. . . . . . . . Too often cases have turned solely on the question of whether the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; too rarely have courts considered the merits of the discrimination claim, such as whether adverse decisions were impermissibly made by the employer on the basis of disability, reasonable accommodations were denied inappropriately, or qualification standards were unlawfully discriminatory. 105 Congress further clarified that it did not intend for the threshold question of disability to be used as a means of excluding individuals from coverage. 106 Finally, Congress expanded the statutory language to clarify that "major life activities" include many symptoms of mental illness: "sleeping . . . speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating and working." 107 98 Id. § 3. 99 Id. 100 Id. § 4. 101 Id. § § 2, 4 (explaining amendments to section three of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). 102 Id. Nevertheless, the Act provides "a covered entity shall not use qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria based on an individual's uncorrected vision unless the standard, test, or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Id. § 5. 103 Id. § 4 (explaining amendments to section three of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006) The ADAAA dramatically expands the definition of disability, providing protection for many more people than previously available under the ADA. Although the Act brings society one step closer to protecting the mentally and physically disabled from discrimination, more steps are required to completely eliminate the discriminatory effects the disabled suffer throughout their lives.
D. The ADAAA Does Not Prohibit Employers From Requiring NonMedical Tests as a Means of Identifying Certain Traits Affecting Work-Related Criteria
Despite its benefits, the ADAAA does not appear to include legislation prohibiting employers from requiring employees (or potential employees) to take non-medical tests identifying certain traits that could affect work-related criteria. Considering that legislation is silent on this issue, courts may assume Congress had no intention to amend the EEOC's "testing" exception to the ADA. The ADA prohibited an employer from asking questions of an applicant seeking to discover disabilities. 108 Nor could the employer require medical examinations of an applicant until after an offer of employment had been made to the applicant. 109 However, the EEOC provided an exception: "[T]ests used to identify such traits as poor judgment, chronic lateness, impulse control . . . are not medical tests."
110
In answer to a written inquiry asking whether an employer could use a handwriting sample or psychological test to screen for "personality traits/characteristics such as a tendency towards a quick temper, inability to concentrate on projects, [or] slow v. quick thinking processes," 111 the EEOC provided an equivocal answer:
[P]sychological tests are medical if they provide evidence that would lead to identifying a mental disorder or impairment, such as those listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). For example, a test designed to reveal whether a characteristic such as 'slow' thinking or 'inability to concentrate' is the result of a mental or psychological impairment is a medical examination. By contrast, tests that are designed and used to measure traits or characteristics such as honesty, tastes, and habits are not 'medical.' 117 involving a chemist fired for refusing to submit to a fitnessfor-duty mental health examination by company doctors did not amount to a violation. 118 In that case, the court did not find impermissible discrimination because the employee's odd behavior created a legitimate business reason for the exam;
119 his co-worker described him as "walking around like he's a zombie." 120 Although the ADA prohibited tests that "screen out (or tend to screen out) people with disabilities," 121 employers can administer medical tests that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 122 Thus, a description of a worker as a "zombie" created a reason for discharge. 123 Congress did not appear to rectify this problem in drafting the ADAAA. In essence, employers could potentially continue to use these tests to weed out the mentally disabled if they can find a legitimate business interest for requiring an employee to take a non-medical test that attempts to measure a type of behavior.
The sum total of disability jurisprudence represents a wholesale failure to accommodate mental illness. Results contradict the ADAAA's mandate that employers tolerate such unique disabilities. The disability law utilizes "a difference model," rather than a formal equality standard, under which an employer is required to the treat all employees the same, regardless of race, gender, or national origin. 124 As a result, one scholar notes, "individuals seeking reasonable accommodation run into resistance from courts that view accommodations as a form of preferential treatment not unlike affirmative NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:646 action." 125 The ADAAA does not prevent employers from using personality tests as proxies for discrimination. Perhaps, the EEOC will address this issue when it provides guidelines for the ADAAA, but as of yet, individuals with mental disabilities or illnesses remain vulnerable to discrimination in employment.
III. PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT
A. Overview of the Law
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act ("Wellstone Act") passed as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 126 The Wellstone Act does not mandate benefits, but it states that if benefits are provided by any employer, "the financial requirements applicable to such mental health or substance use disorder benefits" and the "treatment limitations" can be "no more restrictive than the predominant financial requirements applied to substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan." 127 Additionally, the Act provides that employers cannot implement "cost sharing requirements," separate treatment limitations that are applicable only with respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits. 128 The law defines "'financial requirement' [to include] deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses." 129 "The term 'treatment limitation' includes limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment." 130 Although employers may choose not to offer any mental health insurance, if they cover psychiatric, emotional, or substance abuse disorders, parity rules apply.
Federal officials estimate the Wellstone Act will improve mental health coverage for at least 113 million people. 131 The Congressional Budget Office estimates the Wellstone Act will only "increase premiums by an average of about two-tenths of 1 percent." 132 The Wellstone Act amends the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act ("MHPA"), 133 a limited measure that simply requires group health plans to equalize lifetime and annual dollar limits for mental health and other covered benefits. 134 Neither the original nor the amended laws mandate benefits, and the laws only apply to self-insured plans covered by ERISA and exclude employers with fewer than fifty covered employees. 135 Until 2010, when the Wellstone Act becomes effective, employer plans are allowed to limit mental health benefits, financial requirements can be disparate, and benefits for substance abuse and chemical dependency are explicitly exempt from parity requirements. 136 Under the MHPA, plans can exclude certain categories of mental illness from coverage, and benefits for substance abuse and chemical dependency are explicitly exempt from parity requirements. 137 Any business could apply for an exemption to the MHPA if it could demonstrate that compliance with the law would increase its overall group health plan costs by more than one percent. 138 Unfortunately, the MHPA did not illegalize many of the tools used by health insurers to limit mental health coverage, such as higher co-payments and deductibles, and lower limits on inpatient days and outpatient visits. 139 Even though one required only moderate changes in benefits for the mentally ill, Congress debated this initial measure for four years before making the MHPA law. 140 Significant disparities allowed under the MHPA are those the new Wellstone Act is intended to remedy. The new law retains the small employer and economic hardship exemptions. 141 Large employers enjoy enormous subsidization: the United States tax expenditure reflects what the federal government The Wellstone Act brings us one step closer to having mental health diseases insured in the same manner as allopathic medicine is insured. This is important because the majority of scientific evidence clearly proves "mental illnesses represent real diseases of the brain."
143 For example, "[g]enetic mutations and unlucky combinations of normal genes contribute to the risk of autism and schizophrenia," just like physical ailments caused by genetic mutations.
144
As such, health care costs and coverage should not be based on an arbitrary line distinguishing between a mental healthcare and allopathic medicine. In both cases, people are sick and in need of care. In both cases, when people receive the necessary treatment, people have the potential to get better and re-enter society as productive and independent citizens.
B. The Wellstone Act Still Leaves Room for Potential Disparities
As promising as the Wellstone Act may be, obstacles remain. This section discusses why employers should recognize offering broad mental health coverage to their employees redounds to their benefit.
Because of comprises between Congress and other vested interests, including business and insurance leaders, 145 an employer may choose not to cover certain mental health treatments under the Wellstone Act. 146 Opponents were less hostile towards the Act after the House members agreed not to require mental health plans to cover all conditions specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV ("DSM"), 147 a diagnostic manual last published by the American Psychiatric Association in 2000, and used by psychiatrists, psychologists, and other behavioral health care workers to help diagnose and treat patients.
148
142 Tax expenditures are defined in the law as '''revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of liability. ' 150 Under the Wellstone Act, employers can choose which mental illnesses to cover in their insurance plans, versus having to insure against every DSM listing; this compromise represents a middle-ground to the unappealing "all or nothing" approach. 151 Even though critics note that the DSM includes conditions such as caffeine intoxication and sleep disorders resulting from jet lag, employers may elect to exclude less controversial illnesses like eating disorders, attention deficits, and antisocial psychoses.
152 Addiction treatment does not have to be covered; the law simply requires parity of benefits if it is included in the plan. 153 Potentially, employers could eliminate coverage for certain significant and prominent mental illnesses, thereby making the Act's purpose null and void.
The problem arises when employers choose to arbitrarily exclude illnesses based on stereotypes, false assumptions, or costs. Employers typically overestimate the cost of providing mental health insurance. 154 Based on preliminary data regarding parity coverage, the total number of mental and physical health claims should decrease, and a firm's premiums should actually drop.
155 Furthermore, employers are encouraged to provide coverage because data indicates a positive correlation between behavioral insurance parity and such utilitarian measures as employee absenteeism, over-use of other physical health insurance benefits, and employee productivity. 156 The effect occurs because enhanced behavioral health care creates a healthier, cheaper, and more productive workforce. 
IV. POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE NEW LAWS
The new laws should have at least two positive effects. First, the mandate that mental health coverage be identical to other kinds of health care coverage under the Wellstone Act, and the expansion of the ADAAA to cover the kinds of psychiatric care previously limited or excluded could minimize stereotypes about the mentally ill. Second, the laws should reduce employer costs in general.
A. The New Laws Should Result in Fewer Stereotypes
The Wellstone Act and the ADAAA both express (at least) an intent to reduce stereotypes. This section will discuss the pervasiveness of such stereotypes, their bases and detrimental effects, and provide legislative history that offers hope of change to mental health sufferers.
In 1999, the Surgeon General of the United States prepared a report on the state of mental health.
158 Several authors, including the directors at the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and the Center for Mental Health Services, wrote a foreword in a report to the Surgeon General, complaining that "despite unprecedented knowledge gained in just the past three decades about the brain and human behavior, mental health is often an afterthought and illnesses of the mind remain shrouded in fear and misunderstanding."
159 At that time, estimates showed that "about 28% of the U.S. adult population in any year has a diagnosable mental or addictive disorder, yet only 8% [seek] treatment," 160 in part because of stigma.
161
Much of the stigma is based on misperceptions. A recent survey found that "seventy-one percent of the general population thought that mental illness resulted from an emotional weakness; sixty-five percent thought bad parenting caused mental illness; and forty-five percent thought victims of mental illness could 'will it' away." 162 Two surveys conducted by social science researchers found the public's current opinion toward mental illness more negative than public opinion over half a century ago. 163 In those reports, only ten percent of the general public thought mental illness "had a biological basis or involved the brain." 164 Many people also consider mentally ill individuals as potentially violent, regardless of studies showing the mentally ill are "no more violent than the general population." 166 According to National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, an advocacy group, eighty-seven percent of Americans state television is their "primary source of information about mental illness." 167 Mental illness stereotypes are common in American television programs: the mentally ill are portrayed as evil, psychotic killers, or ridiculed fools; mental illness is depicted as a con. 168 Reduction of stigma is important because stigma causes real discrimination against the mentally ill in areas such as housing, jobs, and custody of children. A recent study concludes that stigma against the mentally ill exacerbates mental health problems, thereby impeding managements' ability to improve the workplace. 169 The Wellstone Act aims to reduce stigma by normalizing mental illness. 170 As Rosalyn Carter, former First Lady and mental health rights activist, summarized during House hearings on the bill, "I have always believed that if insurance covered mental illnesses it would be all right to have them. This may be the reason stigma has remained so pervasive, because these illnesses are treated differently from other health conditions." 171 The Act strives to replace stigma with compassion and sympathy. The ADAAA expresses a parallel intent, perhaps even more emphatically. The clearly stated purpose of the Act is "to carry out the ADA's objectives of providing 'a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination' and 'clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination' by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA."
173 Time will tell if the new laws reduce such stereotypes, but such words offer hope to millions.
B. The New Laws Will Reduce Employer Costs for Mental Illnesses
Another positive effect of the new laws is that costs to businesses should decrease. This section first discusses the cost to employers, in the billions of dollars, for providing improper mental health coverage to employees, either through direct or indirect costs. Second, the new laws, which enable businesses to provide the same benefits for mental health as for allopathic illnesses, will reduce employer costs.
Data gathered over the last two decades reflect the costliness to business in failing to provide mental health parity in employment. In 1995, lost productivity and worker absenteeism as a result of clinical depression cost American businesses $28.8 billion annually. 174 In 1996, 7.8 million workers were mentally ill, and their annual cost to businesses per employee as a result of their mental illness was $4200. 175 In 1997, employers annually paid $180 billion as a result of presenteeism (i.e., coming to work but performing below par) and $118 billion for absenteeism. 176 Figures from 2003 highlighted workplacerelated costs of mental illnesses at approximately $70 billion annually, stemming from absenteeism, turnover and retraining expenses, lower productivity, and increased medical costs. 177 In 2007, American human resources executives ranked mental illness as having more effect on indirect costs for employers than any other health issue.
178
In addition, health insurance plans not covering primary mental illness escalate employers' costs for co-morbidity conditions. Health insurance plans not covering substance abuse treatment, a common co-morbidity condition with 172 Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy). 173 179 Moreover, at least twenty-five percent of hospital admissions are due to alcoholism-related complications and sixty-five percent of emergency room visits are for alcohol or other drug related mental health services, thus costing the employer more, rather than less. 180 The World Health Organization found that untreated mental health problems are by far the most disabling diseases, accounting for more than onefifth of all lost days of productive life. 181 For example, depressed workers miss 5.6 hours per week of productivity due to absenteeism and presenteeism, compared to 1.5 hours for non-depressed workers. 182 Alcohol-related illness and premature death due to alcoholism cost employers over $129.5 billion in lost productivity per year. 183 Providing the same coverage for mental health as for allopathic illness, some researchers posit, results in a lowering of indirect costs for businesses as well. 184 A team of researchers recently studied the effect of increased access to mental health care. 185 They reported, for example: "From the employer's perspective, enhanced depression care yields a [per capita] net cumulative benefit of $2895 after 5 years." 186 Other studies also suggest positive results for employers. A 1998 study found that giving patients access to outpatient mental health services resulted in fewer disability claims than plans without. 187 In 1999, a four-year study of a plan providing mental health coverage yielded a four-to-one return on investment after considering absenteeism, turnover, and medical claims. 188 In 2000, one company reported a 48.9 percent decrease in medical and surgical costs as a result of providing mental health counseling. 189 
